In post-communist transitions, given the steepness of union decline and the inheritance of rigid communist-era Labor Codes, a convenient way to compare the relative efficacy of organized labor is to asses its ability to contain the push for "flexibilization" in the revision of labor regulations. This article compares Poland and the Czech Republic (1989Republic ( -2010 where important differences emerged in revised Labor Codes in such areas as dismissals, fixed-term contracts, collective bargaining and union rights. In all these aspects, Czech labor did significantly better in resisting flexibilization. The explanation rests on the evolution of a legacy union in the Czech Republic that was able to concentrate labor's resources and coordinate with an electorally viable set of left parties to secure their backing for labor's agenda. This was not possible in Poland given the deep divisions within organized labor and the shifting fortunes of left parties in a more volatile party system. The cohesiveness of labor and the viability of left parties do not explain variation in labor power everywhere. They do, however, jointly constitute a portable mechanism that enhances the strength of organized labor in post-communist countries and possibly even in late-developing countries where democratic contestation and market reforms are evident. constituting an important mechanism that, all other things being equal, enhances the ability of organized labor to exert influence under conditions of union decline and liberalization.
The statement from the former Director-General of the International Labor Organization (ILO 1997) may have been overly optimistic, but it rightly suggests that a decline in union membership is not automatically an indicator of labor's impotence. In post-industrial settings, differences in trade unions' strategies, rates of strike activity and modes of concertation --all point to alternative pathways to union renewal (Frege and Kelly 2004; Heckscher and McCarthy 2014) . In post-authoritarian settings, despite the initial domination of legacy unions descended from the old regime, some unions learn to cooperate, devise new strategies and learn to bargain with political and business elites (Caraway, Crowley and Cook 2015; Etchemandy and Collier 2007) . In the case of post-communist transitions, however, the challenge is heightened by the task of managing simultaneous and wholesale political and economic transformations following decades of central planning (Przeworski 1991) . Despite initial optimism about labor's potential role in spearheading civil society (Kubicek 2004) and about the transference European Union industrial relations practices to Eastern Europe (Vickerstaff and Thirkell 1997) , the first decade of post-communism saw a precipitous decline in union density and the futility of "illusory corporatism" (Ost 2000) . These conditions led many to conclude that labor was simply too weak or passive to defend workers' interests or influence policy (Crowley 2004; Crowley and Ost 2001; Kubicek, 2004; Vanhuysse 2006) . Not surprisingly, this coincided with the view that businesses in Eastern Europe enjoyed significantly more flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe (Meardi 2002 ).
This article does not dispute these findings, which are based primarily on observations from the first decade of transition. Rather, it builds on more recent analyses of differences across post-communist labor relations (e.g., Avdagic 2006; Chen and Sil 2006; Cook 2010; Robertson 2004; Sznajder Lee and Trappmann 2016) , with a focus on the indicators and sources of variation in the efficacy of organized labor. Within the context of post-communist transition,
given the steepness of union decline and the fluidity of newly emerging institutions and policies, familiar predictors of labor power (such as union density or rates of strike activity) are not likely to be useful. To the extent that small differences in labor power might emerge over time, these can be better tracked through the efforts to resist the employer-backed push for greater flexibility in employment practices and labor markets. True, the advance of flexibilization has created pressures to transform labor institutions everywhere. The scale and impact have been markedly greater, however, in places where state-guided or centrally planned economies once prioritized "rigidity" in labor markets in the interest of political and social stability (Sil and Candland 2001) .
In the case of communist regimes, this rigidity was evident in remarkably similar Labor Codes that guaranteed full employment, placed severe constraints on dismissals and worker movement, and relied on enterprise unions to manage social benefits. Surprisingly, post-communist reformers were prepared to discard the entire apparatus of central planning, yet chose to retain and revise the Labor Code as the basic framework for labor relations. This provides us with an opportunity to engage in a structured-focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005, 67) : the "structure" consists of a universe of cases that feature similar communist legacies and comparable imperatives of political and economic transformation; and the "focus" concerns the question of whether and how unions in certain countries managed to resist or delay employer-led efforts to dilute worker-friendly labor regulations.
The empirical study is a paired comparison of the Czech Republic and Poland during the first two decades of transition. The two countries satisfy the conditions for a "most similar" systems comparison. They are both democracies that are now European Union members with market economies that are reasonably well integrated into the global economy. In typologies of post-communist economies, the two countries are usually placed in the same category as, for example, in Bohle and Greskovits (2012) who classify them as cases of "embedded liberalism."
Also, while business associations in both countries were organized speedily and quickly became influential, organized labor in both countries had to contend with significant declines in union density amid rising unemployment. The period under consideration spans two decades, from 1989 to about 2010. Given that the first decade of transition was a time of rapid institutional change and extreme uncertainty, the longer time-frame allows us to analyze labor politics against the more stable configurations of interests over time. Indeed, the main battles over revising the Labor Code did not get under way until after the first decade of transition, by which time the rate of union decline had slowed down, and both the political system and market economy were more consolidated. At the same time, to analyze labor politics under relatively stable conditions, it is necessary to exclude the period from 2010 onward since the onset of the financial crisis affected the two countries in different ways and led to heightened uncertainties and emergency measures that temporarily distorted the dynamics of labor politics. Within this period, the comparison is aimed at establishing and explaining differences in the extent of flexibilization achieved through changes in labor law, particularly the revised Labor Code. The argument developed below is intended not only to explain the different trajectories of Poland and the Czech Republic, but also to illuminate certain permissive conditions that allow organized labor to be politically efficacious in the face of union decline and pressures for flexibilization.
Section one demonstrates that, even with common principles linked to EU accession, significant differences emerged between Poland and the Czech Republic in such areas as the procedures and costs of termination, schemes for unemployment insurance, the use of fixed-term (temporary) contracts, the scope of collective bargaining, and union rights vis-a-vis newly established works councils. In these aspects, labor's preferences were more closely aligned with the outcome in the Czech Republic than in Poland. The next two sections highlight two factors that jointly affected labor's ability to resist flexibilization as labor politics became more routinized in post-communist settings. Section two focuses on the cohesiveness (or lack thereof) of organized labor, at least as it impacted union-led collective action during policy or legislative debates affecting employment relations. Cohesiveness was greater in the Czech Republic, where a legacy union remained the dominant union but learned to leverage its inherited resources and membership base to advocate more effectively on behalf of employees. Polish labor, by contrast, was hurt by the presence of two large confederations that represented most of the unionized workforce but were divided in their priorities and political allegiances. As section three argues, however, the net impact of labor's cohesiveness depends on the availability of electorally viable left parties willing to back labor-friendly positions in the legislature in exchange for electoral support from the working class. The conclusion characterizes this two-pronged argument as a special variant of the "labor-and-left" thesis that was popularized in earlier studies of European labor relations (e.g. Huber and Stephens 2001; Lehmbruch 1984; Williamson 1989) but the logic of which seems more relevant now to post-communist transitions (and to late-industrializing states that are at least partly democratic and pursuing sustained market reforms). While the cohesiveness of unions and their linkages to viable left parties are neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining the efficacy of organized labor power, they may be regarded as jointly constituting an important mechanism that, all other things being equal, enhances the ability of organized labor to exert influence under conditions of union decline and liberalization.
I. The Quest for Flexibilization in Poland and the Czech Republic
Labor relations under communism presumed a unity of purpose among planners, managers and workers. Communist regimes adopted similar Labor Codes, including the Czechoslovak Code of 1965 and the Polish Code of 1974, that guaranteed all citizens the right to employment, established automatic dues-paying union membership in most enterprises, and laid out specific regulations for the dismissal or reassignment of workers. Within these frameworks, trade unions served as "transmission belts" for coordinating efforts to meet production targets and managing the distribution of social benefits. But, they also played a role in ensuring that any dismissals or reassignments were carried out per regulations (Pravda and Ruble 1986) .
After 1989, in a rapidly shifting environment marked by extreme uncertainty, workers, unions, and private employers, all had to adjust to new realities, including the steady divergence in the interests of labor and business. In the course of a fluid transition, many of the usual predictors of labor power in post-industrial countries simply did not work (Armingeon 2006 (Bohle and Greskovits 2012, 184-91; Kideckel 2001; Robertson 2004; Varga 2014) .
Similarly, institutions set up for tripartite social dialogue, while ostensibly giving unions some voice, at best generated marginal agreements that had little bearing on workers' livelihoods in the midst of wholesale privatization (Ost 2000) . Even in Poland, where the Solidarity trade union had ties to leading reformers and was consulted on the process of privatization (Paczyńska 2009 ), the discussions were predicated on the acceptance of closures and mass dismissals that would push Poland's unemployment rate to 20 percent by 2002 (Ost 2005) . Under the conditions of radical transformation, tripartite commissions simply did not function as intended, and union participation turned out to be more a formality than an indicator of influence.
Yet, the shared legacy of communist-era labor relations does yield a different sort of proxy for estimating the efficacy of organized labor in post-communist settings: the extent to which unions managed to limit the advance of flexibilization in the course of revising workerfriendly labor regulations. This move is predicated on the fact that, across post-communist regimes, preexisting Labor Codes, rather than being jettisoned along with the system of central planning, continued to provide the basic framework for labor relations and became the object of contentious efforts to amend various provisions for the sake of flexibility. In this context, flexibilization is understood to mean the overall ease with which employers are able to employ or dismiss workers, to set the terms of their employment, to arrange work schedules as needed, and to define the range of issues subject to bargaining with employees' representatives. Given that communist-era Labor Codes were designed to establish "rigidity" in labor relations, postcommunist reforms everywhere included efforts to increase flexibility. Yet, over time, significant variation emerged in the degree of flexibilization, with organized labor in some post-communist countries significantly more satisfied with the outcome.
Once communist regimes fell, the Labor Code remained in place, but new acts were adopted by decree to establish collective bargaining and the right to strike. Other revisions were adopted during the 1990s without much strife to adjust the language of labor regulations to facilitate their application to a newly emerging private sector. More fundamental revisions, however, would to be much more contentious. those same standards). In both cases, EU accession produced some general guidelines, such as tripartite social dialogue, the introduction of employee councils, and the balancing of flexibility with employee rights (Bluhm 2008; Wasileski and Turkel 2008) . And, in both cases business associations lobbied hard to minimize restrictions on employers, while unions sought to preserve worker-friendly clauses (Gardawski et al. 2012; Myant 2010 ). Yet, in the end, important differences emerged in key elements of the revised Labor Code and related regulations, with labor in the Czech Republic faring better on each of these elements.
Dismissals. Although layoffs became more easy in both countries, the revised Czech
Code retained far more specificity in the conditions that must be met before dismissals, even retaining some of the language from the communist era -"for organizational reasons" (Wasileski and Turkel 2008, 271) . This specificity permitted more challenges from laid off workers who could question the conditions under which they were given notice, a situation that Czech employers sought to avoid by agreeing to relatively more generous severance packages where termination was by mutual agreement (Wasileski and Turkel 2008) . The cost to employers for laying off a worker in the Czech Republic was substantially higher than in Poland owing to clauses requiring a longer period of notification (two months) as well as a more substantial severance package (three months' pay). Poland made allowances of one month's pay in cases where those being terminated were eligible for retirement or disability benefits, but otherwise immediately transitioned newly unemployed individuals into the unemployment insurance scheme. In terms of weekly salary, the net cost of firing an employee in the Czech Republic came out to be 65 percent higher than in Poland, about 22 weeks of salary as opposed to 13 weeks in the latter (Kuddo 2009 Collective bargaining agreements. Collective bargaining, initially introduced by decree following the end of communism, was the subject of major debates, with employers in both countries wanting to drastically limit its scope. In the Czech case, unions and left parties insisted on expansive use of collective bargaining as a condition for allowing employers more flexibility with respect to work schedules, including overtime. In Poland, limits on overtime work were roughly similar but allowed for additional scheduling based on individual contracts and specific workplace regulations (Bluhm 2008, 73 open to restrictions retained in the revised Czech Code. Yet, the evidence suggests that Czech business associations were deeply frustrated with the outcome. Notably, the Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic, the largest employers' organization in the country, complained bitterly about the regulations governing dismissals which, they argued, were in some ways more restrictive than before (Hála 2006b ). In contrast, Polish employers' organizations, although asking for still more flexibility, were the main driving force behind the revisions to the Polish Code (Towalski 2002 The situation changed, however, once it as clear that Solidarity-backed political leaders were prepared to accept falling real wages and rising unemployment as the necessary cost of transitioning to a market economy (Ost 2005) . This is what enabled OPZZ to not only survive but attract new members, including workers and local unions defecting from Solidarity. Other groups also left Solidarity's national trade union organization, including Solidarity 80, which independently organized mass anti-government protests and created an opening for excommunists to come to power in 1993. Although Solidarity trade unionists also organized some labor protests and joined others (Ekiert and Kubik 1999) , rivalries between Solidarity, OPZZ, and smaller unions prevented labor as a whole from effectively resisting employers' efforts to gut the social protection of workers in the early 1990s (Ost 2005, ch. 4; Gardawski et al. 2012 ).
The division between OPZZ and Solidarity would become a routine feature of Polish politics from the mid-1990s on, reinforced by competing political and ideological orientations.
Solidarity unions regularly sided with right-of-center parties (even as they changed labels and leaders), whereas OPZZ tended to ally with the ex-communist party that spearheaded the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). Thus, whatever opportunities labor officials had to participate in successive governments did not strengthen the position of trade unions writ large, but instead contributed to the "subordination of trade union demands to the exigencies of political coalitionmaking" (Trappmann 2012, 8) . Moreover, by the early 2000s, OPZZ's membership had grown to the point that both Solidarity and OPZZ claimed over 600,000 members, accounting for more than two-thirds of a unionized workforce (Carley 2009 ). This made it difficult for either center to dominate the labor movement as a whole, which would not necessarily be a problem were it not for their inability to cooperate -even on issues on which their positions overlapped. The result, at least over the first two decades of transition, was a divided labor movement that has been characterized as "bipolar" (Avdagic 2006) or "dualistic" (Trappmann 2012 ).
During the debates over the Labor Code, Solidarity and OPZZ saw eye-to-eye on the issue of preserving union rights with respect to collective agreements at the workplace. Beyond that, however, the two unions could not formulate a common position to push back against the employers' associations that pushed for greater flexibility in the revised labor regulations.
Solidarity, despite its earlier support for shock therapy and privatization, resisted the proposed amendments and mobilized large-scale protests against the government when the revised Code was adopted. OPZZ, given that its political ally -the social democratic SLD -was in power, was more open to negotiating with the government; but, its leadership faced internal challenges from those frustrated with the concessions made (Gardawski 2002 ). In the end, although most members of both trade union centers were frustrated with the outcome, it was their own rivalry that had stood in the way of the concerted action needed to contend with the determined push for flexibilization by employers' associations. later play a role (Orenstein 2001) . Moreover, the unions did win one early victory on their own that was not insignificant: in the new 1990 law on collective bargaining adopted by decree, ČSKOS managed to lobby against the creation of works' councils where union organizations existed so as to preserve the latter's bargaining power at the workplace (Pollert 2001, 20) . Thus, although Czech unions did not seem nearly as politically active in the first four or five years of transition as Solidarity was in Poland, it would be a mistake to interpret the role of unions as indicative of perennial labor weakness.
As the contours of labor politics became more routinized after the mid-1990s, ČMKOS'
role became more visible, more institutionalized, and more coordinated. While ČMKOS was a quintessential legacy union that inherited the bulk of its resources and membership from the former communist trade union apparatus, this inheritance gradually turned into a valuable asset as the federation began to play a central role in the labor movement. ČMKOS' resources enabled it to build a font of legal and technical expertise at its central offices, provide expert assistance to branch and company affiliates, and eventually develop a political strategy. While ČMKOS would lose some of its branch affiliates (such as the railway workers' union and doctors' union) to a newer federation, the Association of Independent Trade Unions (ASO). While ASO became the second largest federation, at no point accounted for more than 15 percent of union members; more importantly, it encompassed diverse branch unions pursuing independent labor actions without much coordination (Myant 2010) . ČMKOS has remained central actor in the labor movement, accounting for over two-thirds of the unionized workforce (Carley 2009) 
III. Left Parties -More Stable and Relevant in the Czech Republic
Amid rising prices and job loss in the early years of transition, communist successor parties in Eastern Europe did well to tap into deepening public anxiety to build a new electoral base (Cook and Orenstein 1999) . Many of these parties proved especially adept at leveraging "portable skills and usable pasts" in the new context of democratic contestation (Grzymała-Busse 2002, 265) . In Poland, as disgruntled voters reeled from the initial impact of shock therapy, former communists quickly reorganized themselves as a social democratic party at the helm of the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD). Over the first decade of transition, the SLD learned to act as a catch-all party, showing concern for the social costs of market reforms but also eager to demonstrate its competence in advancing market reforms and meeting commitments to international financial institutions (Cook and Orenstein 1999, 74-5) . In contrast, the Czech excommunists retained the term "communist" in their name -the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) -and regularly appealed to a narrow band of voters, chiefly pensioners and public employees who stood to lose many of the social benefits they were accustomed to.
While the SLD managed to form the government twice, in 1993-1997 and 2001-2005 These conditions proved favorable to Czech labor during debates over the Labor Code, not only because the left parties generally were sympathetic to its position, but also because ČSSD had strong links to ČMKOS, whose members constituted a sizable portion of the electorate. Despite its official stance of neutrality, there were numerous channels through which ČMKOS coordinated its activities with ČSSD -for example, by issuing joint calls for strikes (Perottino and Polášek 2013, 426) . And, while ČMKOS claimed to be open to cooperating with any party that backed its positions, by the end of the 1990s, it was clear that the party that most consistently met this criterion was the ČSSD (Hála et al. 2002, 15) . During the 2006 elections, ČMKOS even shared with its members an analysis of party manifestos on key issues of relevance to workers -including wage policy, employment law, and collective bargainingwhich concluded that ČMKOS preferences were more closely aligned with the positions of ČSSD and KSČM than with those of any other party (Myant 2010, 27 ).
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The convergence in positions of labor and the left parties was buttressed by the movement of key leaders between ČMKOS and ČSSD. In fact, the first leaders of the revived 2 The second largest labor federation, ASO, was much smaller, did not always have a unified stance, and did not do anything to undermine the cooperation between CMKOS and the left parties (Myant 2010) . Other parties that embraced something resembling a leftist program were either extremely small or became drawn to the religious or cultural agenda of right-of-center parties (Rueschemeyer and Wolchik 1999, 29-31) . Thus, the SLD was the only recognizable representative of the Polish left The union-party ties constructed by Solidarity's trade union activists and right-of-center political elites are not surprising, but at least through early 2000s, they dealt a serious blow to the efforts of left parties to garner working class support and to the prospects for collective action in defense of workers' rights and livelihoods (Ost 2005, esp. 149-78; Trappmann 2012) .
Thus, although the Polish left appeared to have extremely strong prospects when the SLD gained power in 1993, it subsequently had difficulty maintaining its electoral strength, despite a second triumph in 2001. Without the sustained backing of a unified labor movement (given the aforementioned division between Solidarity and OPZZ), the SLD had to negotiate with other groups, including private employers' associations and international financial institutions. Under these conditions, the SLD's survival -unlike that of the ČSSD in the Czech Republicdepended on being able to act as a catch-all party (Cook and Orenstein 1999) . Ironically, this also meant that it did not maintain a recognizable electoral base that could generate some minimum level of support over successive electoral cycles. And, in the end, the SLD's time at the helm of the Polish government, even though it coincided with the debates over the Labor Code, did little to slow down the push for flexibilization.
IV. Conclusion: Labor and the Left -Once More Unto the Breach?
In contrast to earlier scholarship emphasizing the common weakness of post-communist labor, this article has sought to track variation in labor's resistance to the push for flexibilization during efforts to revise Labor Codes inherited from the communist era. As seen in section one, This result could not have been anticipated at the outset and may even be regarded as somewhat surprising. In Poland, Solidarity emerged with tremendous political capital, having led a movement that helped topple a communist regime and initiate a dramatic post-communist transformation; but in the process, Solidarity-backed politicians came to embrace the full range of neoliberal policies, including the need for labor market flexibility, and so whatever advantages labor may have once enjoyed were quickly forfeited in the process of competing dyads of parties and unions working at cross purposes. In the Czech Republic, where the neoliberal reformer Klaus initially had the upper hand and a strong commitment to full-blown market reforms, organized labor was mostly represented by a legacy union that remained on the sidelines during the "velvet revolution" in 1989; yet, that union adapted, developed more competencies, and learned to bargain with not only businesses but with parties that proved to have some "staying power" while facing electoral competition. Both organized labor and potentially pro-labor parties adapted to a changing institutional environment, but it is in the Czech Republic that we see a less fragmented labor movement that was able to leverage its links to stable parties on the left to amplify its voice even under conditions of union decline and pressures for flexibilization (see Figure 1 ). 
COMBINED STRENGTH OF LEFT
The argument may be regarded as a special case of the "labor-and-left" thesis, which once highlighted the role of concertation between large unions and social democratic parties in establishing corporatist institutions and advancing pro-labor agendas in Europe (Huber and Stephens 2001; Lehmbruch 1984; Williamson 1989) . With the advent of post-Fordism and the concomitant decline of unions, these ties are seen to have become attenuated, or at least less consequential (Anthonsen et al. 2011 ; see also Lash and Urry 1987) . In post-communist settings, the labor-and-left thesis, to the extent it received a hearing at all (e.g. Avdagic 2006) , was seen as irrelevant in the midst of simultaneous transitions to democracy and market economies, especially given the volatility of emerging party systems and the seemingly quiescent posture of shrinking trade unions. While this may have been true during the first decade of transition, this article proceeds from the view that, over time, the eventual stabilization of the institutional environment warrants a reexamination of the labor-and-left argument (Rueschemeyer 1999) . At least in the two countries compared here, it is evident that, despite continuing union decline and mounting pressures to boost flexibility, the cohesiveness of organized labor and the electoral viability of left parties combine well to explain why revised labor regulations ended up more closely aligned with the preferences of labor in the Czech Republic than in Poland.
It is important to clarify that these two core explanatory factors are neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining variations in labor power or in the extent of flexibilization everywhere.
In fact, in many developing and post-socialist countries, neither trade unions (however unified), nor left parties (however sympathetic to labor) have been able to slow down the advance of laws and policies designed to dismantle preexisting social pacts and boost labor market flexibility (Sil and Candland 2001) . And, where there are some marginal successes, these may well be the result of different sets of factors depending on the nature of the regime and the relative importance of different sectors. China, Russia, and South Africa all have large trade union federations, but in all three cases, to varying degrees, the federations have been kept tightly connected to ruling parties so as to preempt large-scale social unrest (with markedly less success in South Africa).
There are also left parties worldwide that moved away from preexisting commitments to the social protection of labor in favor of market reforms, whether to satisfy conditions imposed by international financial institutions or to boost private-sector growth and foreign investment.
Yet, while the "labor and left" thesis may not constitute a general explanation for variation in labor politics, nor should it be treated as an idiosyncratic account relevant to only the cases examined here. Other Eastern European countries also saw central planning quickly dismantled to make way for market economies, while new patterns of political contestation took hold and new policy imperatives emerged in relation to the requirements of European Union accession. Consequently, labor in these other post-communist countries have had to contend with challenges not unlike those faced by labor in Poland and the Czech Republic -particularly the combined effects of rapid union decline and mounting pressures for flexibilization. In this regard, since the differences between the outcomes in the Czech Republic and Poland capture much of the range of possible variation, the labor-and-left thesis may be considered a plausible hypothesis to capture emerging differences in the dynamics of labor politics and the efficacy of organized labor across post-communist countries.
Indeed, the core logic of the argument is abstract enough that it can be adapted to assess labor's relative strength/weakness in developing countries, at least insofar as certain conditions are present. These include: multi-party electoral competition, policies aimed at market reform, trade union federations that are at least semi-autonomous, and legislative battles over preexisting laws and regulations viewed as rigid and obsolete by business. These conditions essentially generate a "family resemblance" between post-communist countries and developing countries engaged in liberalization, at least in terms of the politics of flexibilization (Sil and Candland 2001) . Further research is needed to determine the portability the "labor-and-left" argument across different institutional settings in the developing world. But, through carefully designed "contextualized comparison" (Locke and Thelen 1995) , it is possible to explore whether and how the cohesiveness of organized labor and the electoral competitiveness of left parties might offer some insights into why unions in some countries may be able to exert relatively more power and influence even in the face of union decline and mounting pressures for flexibilization.
